Burmese Language
Retaking power in Burma (Pt. 1)
Prevailing current opinion is that Burma’s elections this year will be a charade and the opposition is right to condemn them. Burma, commentators say, is a totalitarian state controlled by a military clique that has ruled the country for nearly half a century. But the myth of totalitarianism should be challenged, as should the assumption that there is no potential for meaningful social change to exist around the election process. Because while the conditions for politics in Burma are hardly ideal, a legitimate opportunity for reconnecting with average people – and opposing the military’s march toward pseudo-normalcy – exists in this year’s elections.
The debate requires an accurate understanding of how power in the country functions, particularly in regards to how it operates to constrain and/or animate politics. So to examine power, let us begin with a story in two parts:
The first is that society is so suffused with fear of the state that Burmese will only whisper about politics, even when they are walking along a noisy city street. The sheer number of journalistic accounts telling of this narrative is remarkable (Google the words ‘Burma’ and ‘whisper’ together), and demonstrates its durable and diffuse reality in Burma, not to mention the media’s ongoing obsession with it.
But the second part of the story complicates the first: if people are afraid to speak of politics, one might expect lots of men with guns on those streets. Yet, the thugs refuse to materialize. How can these two phenomena exist simultaneously? The common explanation is that Burmese people live under the constant watch of the state, and over time have internalized the panopticon: there isn’t the need for men with guns at every corner because people discipline their neighbours by silencing themselves.
This story is largely true: oppositional politics – which have primarily involved militating for “human rights”, parliamentary political processes, and legal reforms – is viewed by people as irredeemably dangerous in Burma, to be avoided. If politics is like a muscle that needs to be exercised in order to remain strong, the Burmese collective political muscles have degenerated over the years.
Juxtapose this first story with another: that of the NGO currently holding sessions on ‘civic education’ with local community associations, discussing both procedural and normative issues around democracy. “What is the right form of government?” “What do other Constitutions around the world look like? How does ours compare?” “What is the role of an engaged citizenry?” The NGO is able to hold forums around these kinds of questions. And while this NGO may be somewhat exceptional – in that it has etched out an ability over time and with painstaking effort to hold sensitive activities – it is not Myanmar Egress. By which it is not that controversial organization that sometimes appears the exception that proves the rule. Rather, this NGO is more like the others: just one of a rampantly growing Burmese civil society sector. Estimates have 240,000 organizations delivering social services, running spiritual groups, assembling cultural and recreation events, and providing community-based forums for discussions about socioeconomic development. While all of these groups (Egress included) have to navigate the state in one way or another – which entails, inter alia, never encroaching into the terrain of the political – many are effectively independent from state domination. This story is also true.
How can both stories then exist side-by-side? How can the state evince seemingly totalitarian tendencies in certain spheres, but abandon so much space in others? A simple answer is that events in Burma have been consistently misinterpreted by external critics. They assume that militarised Burma is a nightmarish reflection of the ‘modern state’, a hegemonic collection of institutions and structures that centralises and bureaucratises everything to control and discipline all aspects of political subjects’ lives.
Burma, however, lacks the population management tools needed to reach into every corner of its nation and control its citizens. To illustrate: there are no biometric identity cards, no security cameras on every street corner; there is neither a robust social security system, nor a sophisticated taxation apparatus. Indeed, when cyclone Nargis occurred in 2008, communication was so poor that the military had to get its marching orders by interpreting the newspapers! The Burmese state is a different animal altogether.
Does this mean the state is not as bad as it is sometimes portrayed? On the contrary, in many ways it can be even more brutal and despotic in the absence of these other structures. The key is that Burma’s military-state deploys resources selectively to create its regime of control, and the generals prefer control on the cheap. Indeed, realizing totalitarian control would necessitate sacrificing resources currently expended on priorities for maintaining political stability: namely, buttressing military and police apparatuses such that they can quash any perceived threat, and directing resources toward military families and business-sector clients.
In Burma, power radiates out of centres and dissipates over geographical and institutional space, operating through peripheral officials who dominate political activity, attempt to monopolize violence, extract resources (through small-scale resource plundering), and maintain social order through intermediaries (communities themselves). In fact, the military-state likely sees totalitarian control as actually risky, as it leaves civilians with few avenues for escape from the state: patronage networks, maintained through bribes and personal relationships, would be restricted, likewise would the black market that keeps resources flowing to places of demand. Whether consciously or not, the military-state has avoided power relationships that spur collective resistance.
In this way, it is helpful to utilize political scientist Michael Mann’s typology: the state deploys high despotic power (the ability to crush what it can see) but low infrastructural power (an absence of institutions that would allow it to see everything). Where it is strongest, the state attains significant control at reduced cost: despotic power, while focused around political expression, leeches into the social realm as well. When people are significantly dominated politically – and when almost any act can always be interpreted as a political one – silence comes to deafen much of the population (punctuated by moments of collective eruptions at the indignity and oppression of it all – 1988, 1996, 2007 – before silence descends again). This results in a simple avoidance of political topics; coded speech when there is speech about politics at all; a lack of trust in general of those outside of the family; and an absence of ‘social capital’. In this regard the state gets something for nothing.
Civil society space
At the same time though, because power is not total, there are spaces at peripheries – both institutional and geographic – for civil society to grow and function relatively autonomously. Power dissipates concentrically, both through the three institutional branches of the state (military, Peace and Development Council [police], administration), and away from the geographical centres of power (Rangoon, Naypyidaw, major cities). Therefore, a local commander in a distant Chin state village (geographical), or a low-level official in the marginally powerful Ministry of Social Welfare in Rangoon (institutional) may both be distant from the centres of military-state power.
As a result, these agents retain a certain autonomy to recreate their own systems of control. Many choose to be as despotic (in the case of commanders or police) or as uncooperative and/or scrutinizing (in the case of state administration) as the central state. This is especially true in ethnic areas where “security threats” are privileged by police or military on the ground – often agents there are even more abusive than the standard centralized state. However, many agents cannot afford to replicate the central state’s will. This is because they are constrained from both above and below: superiors from above demand a subdued populace, while the agent must manage patron/client relationships, as well as ensure that conditions don’t completely deteriorate for the people below.
Many state agents thus must propose a bargain: they reach out to civil society for assistance. This is somewhat risky: civil society has some inherent political content – indeed, people getting together to talk about how to address social problems tends to lead to conversations about the nature of those problems, which is inherently political. But in the end the state agent feels the bargain is worth the risk. Civil society political content is likely too meagre itself to spark rebellion, given the way that power pre-empts the formation of broader political consciousness; given the way that collective forms of political resistance have been put down by the despotic power of the state in the past. And so the state agents allow civil society participation; not only that, they often prevent centralized-state penetration of civil society activities: they lie to their higher-ups, or more accurately, engage in the brilliant strategy of plausible deniability when interacting with civil society: ‘Just don’t tell me what you’re doing!’
Local state agents therefore simultaneously deploy two contradictory desires: they want to ensure civil society does not act politically, yet they also refuse to know what civil society is actually doing! This results in tense and symbiotic bargains which remain stable only provided civil society is both apolitical and will always remain so. In other words: the state vets an organization, ensures it is only delivering services, and then is compelled by the limits of a system of despotic power and its own need for plausible deniability to become partially blind to civil society’s future activities. And herein lies the opportunity.
Let us imagine if civil society organizations began bending the rules. Not breaking them (holding mass rallies), but simply bending them (beginning to facilitate covertly political discussions: talking about politics through other idioms). Given that these pockets of space do exist in Burma for discussion and perhaps even politics, imagine if there was a mechanism for imbuing that civil society with political consciousness and get it to begin disrupting the current ossified bargains.
Part two will explore how this might play out. The argument will not be for rebellion, but rather that the expected elections may be a first moment in a slow process of repeated negotiations with, and demands of, the state. These demands, emerging necessarily from a number of different realms of civil society, may lead to a potentially radical transformation of power and society in Burma.
Elliott Prasse-Freeman is currently an MPA-ID student at the Harvard Kennedy School, and is leading a number of research projects through the university’s Human Rights and Social Movements Program. He spent five years working in international development for various agencies—from the UN to international NGOs—where he directed projects in Burma, India, Thailand, and other countries in Southeast Asia.
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No seriously scholar or journalist has labelled Burma totalitarian over the past decade. Even Aung San Suu Kyi who called the regime fascist and totalitarian in 1988-89 now addresses the regime simply as ”authorities.”
From my experience and interaction with civil society friends back in Myanmar, I hold that one of the key reasons the civil society is generously allowed to exist is that it is opposing sanctions and endorsing elections. The Burmese legal and semi-legal civil society actors can be political in that way. I do hope that the current loophole for civil society lasts beyond 2010 since it is filling much needed education and health care spaces left ignored by the state. The long-term political potential of Burma’s nascent civil society may be too far-fetched….we might not see the fruit of the efforts of the current civil society in this generation, that is in 25-30 years time.
This “analysis” looks like something cooked up by SPDC propagandist & free speech for the oppressors posterboy “plan B” over at The Irrawaddy.
This piece seeks to deny the true nature of the SPDC regime, and the author’s comments relect the duplicitous manner in which the regime is proceeding with the sham elections by sweeping aside the rights of the Burmese people in favor of their own skewed ideas of “disciplined democracy” by gunpoint.
The author has glaringly omitted recognition of any kind that the Burmese military regime is not presenting any opportunities for “discussion” or “negotiation” to the ethnic minorities, whose torture and persecution is the primary mission of the hundreds of thousands of shock-troops of the massive Burma army which the successive military dictatorships have built, trained, and deployed in the ethnic homelands for decades.
Ohh, the pitiful humanity walking the city streets in fear, not knowing which way to turn, but always remembering that they are only shot like dogs in the street if they protest.
Meanwhile, their ethnic minority countrymen are not only regularly shot on sight, they are also beaten, raped, tortured, starved and subjected to forced labour, forced relocation, and forced starvation not because they have protested against the regime, but because as the Burman Generals see it, they were born to be persecuted and controlled.
The Burmese ethnic minority citizens are like regime owned herds of livestock to be worked, sold, or slaughtered as their owners see fit.
Nothing positive can ever happen in Burma until the violent persecution and enslavement of millions of Burmese ethnic minority citizens is no longer tolerated by the urban citizenry, whom the author depicts in this story as being so frightened of the regime that they must whisper about politics even when walking down a crowded and noisy street.
Discussions?
Negotiations?
Trust the regime and its Armani-clad mutants to do what is right for ALL Burmese people?
Treating the SPDC mutants as though they are NOT murderers, extortionists, rapists, thieves, and monk-killers?
Despite the author’s lengthy and overly verbose synopsis of the political and social issues faced by the Burmese citizenry, he seems to be completely vested in promoting the fallicy of a kinder and gentler post-election regime, which is currently deploying its shock-troops to provoke fights in the ethnic homelands, destroying ethnic minority villages, and attacking innocent Burmese ethnic minority citizens.
The title of this piece should be “How to Help the SPDC Continue to Oppress and Rape Burma”
Part One.
Retaking power in Burma?
It is the regime that did NOT HONOUR the landslide victory of the NLD in the 1990 election.
It is the regime that did NOT TRANFER THE POWER to the elected MPs after that FREE & FAIR ELECTION.
It is the regime that did NOT HEED the calls of the NLD for the National Reconciliation.
For 20 years onwards, it is the regime that has been persistant in DENYING THE RIGHTS of the populace: The choice of its own Democratic Government in 1990.
Then, again, another ELECTION!!!
So, that FASCIST REGIME is about to retake the power BLATANTLY again in Burma?
Perhaps Garrett hasn’t been to Burma and met with civil society actors engaged in real political work? If this assumption is wrong, please forgive my arrogance.
From my own experience in Burma and working with Burmese, I am beginning to see that many of the author’s points need more attention from the international community, who is sorely lacking in a unified response. I do not condone the atrocities of the SPDC, but nor do I think sanctions and rote condemnation are going to change anything (look at FM Nyan Win’s recent ASEAN trip where he turned a deaf ear to any criticism and all pressing questions).
In the meantime, I think Elliott has rightly placed his emphasis on civil society and the spaces NGOs have found to interact with local authorities where available to do some good and expand an emerging dialogue.
Elliott, I would agree with you on many points and look forward to Pt. 2.
“Because while the conditions for politics in Burma are hardly ideal, a legitimate opportunity for reconnecting with average people – and opposing the military’s march toward pseudo-normalcy – exists in this year’s elections.”
This assumption sounds logical. But no, it is not correctly juxtaposed wth applicability. A rudeness cannot be logically connected with civility or civilised culture.
The current military culture is set rigid in their own brain-washed “conditionality” that does not know any logic toward the civic society. Besides, it discuses “legetimate opportunity”. Does the authour really think there is any legetimacy or any such tendency with the junta, or is there any opportunity for farmers, workers and the educated youth, the hills people inclusive, in Burma?
So, this thesis goes haywire from the very beginning.
It seems to me that this is part of the junta’s attempt to confuse and split up the country-wide unity of the people aleady gathering momentum.
Hunter wrote:
“Perhaps Garrett hasn’t been to Burma and met with civil society actors engaged in real political work? If this assumption is wrong, please forgive my arrogance.”
Dear Hunter,
You’re forgiven.
I am not sure of which Burma you are speaking about that you seem to have experienced.
Is it the Burma of the favored citizens who enjoy political repression and impoverishment as the reward for raising their sons to become Burma army shock troops?
Or is it the Burma of the un-favored ethnic minority citizens who suffer endless rape, extortion, torture, and persecution at the hands of the Burma army shock-troops who love their jobs so much that they practically work for free?
As for the favored citizens, they live in the light of day, we all know what they should do, and we all see what they don’t do.
We know what they should be standing up for in terms of human rights, and we see what they have apathetically ignored, decade after decade.
The rising price of freedom and democracy doubles each year.
Anyone can go the tourist route in Burma, and they will be shown a wonderful time, they will be treated like kings, they will hang out in luxurious hotel lounges, and take lovely balloon tours of the ancient ruins.
But what will they learn about Burma?
Are their smiling hosts going to mention that over 100,000 children under five years die of treatable diseases each year in the ethnic homelands?
Will they inform tourists that the SPDC not only does nothing to help disease and starvation in the ethnic homelands, but that it has made it all but impossible for INGO’s to attempt to provide aid?
While the tourists are shopping for crafts, drinking tea, and buying longyis in the marketplace will anyone mention to them that behind the Bamboo Curtain where they cannot travel to, the Burma army waits until rice harvest time to attack and destroy villages in order to deny the people their homes, their food and their livelyhoods so they can starve them into submitting to forced relocation and forced labour?
Will the philosophcal taxi drivers complain about the terrible persecution of the ethnic minority citizens whose schools, churches, and clinics are regularly burned by the Burma army forces?
No probably not, they want your money, not to kill your “Burma buzz”.
My experience in Burma has been from the un-favored citizens’ viewpoint.
My experience with “civil society actors” has been as a feet on the ground advisor along the border who has lived among Burmese refugees, visited refugee camps and jungle IDP villages. I have heard their stories first-hand, not as a day visitor being shown around on the refugee camp visitor circuit.
I have helped them to organize schools, clinics, and fresh water supplies for villages.
I have lived with and worked with Burmese refugee orphans and helped provide for their needs.
I think the biggest issue I have with this analysis, is that there are far too many politically correct rhetorical $5 words, and far too little straight forward “take a chance on hurting someone’s feelings” talk in order to speak the TRUTH in plain language and CLEAR points.
For example, in Burma, the oxymoronic statement “civil society actors engaged in real political work”, would make more sense if simply described either as a political prisoner, a soon-to-be political prisoner, or a regime puppet.
It’s simple –
BOYCOTT THE SHAM ELECTIONS!
CARE ABOUT ALL OF YOUR YOUR COUNTRYMEN!
STOP FEEDING OTHER PEOPLE AND THEIR CHILDREN TO THE WOLVES!
A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
Garrett, you appear to have missed the point. the author is theorising about how the lay population can use the junta’s own shortcomings (paranoia, fear of pressure and conflagration, poor intra-state communication) to its own benefits – as you say, of course the generals won’t automatically transform into a moderate government after the elections, but this isn’t the premise of the article. What it’s saying is that the ‘weak’ period for the government around the elections can be exploited through subtle organisation by the grassroots, which has essentially stagnated through years of oppression and which has not had the capacity or drive to attempt a new kind of political manoeuvring.
Like any country, any authoritarian state, there are major weak points within the government that are a byproduct of its tunnel vision and indifference to compromise. These can be penetrated if a campaign is organised well and if it is carried through in a steady, subtle way (one that doesn’t shock the generals into a knee-jerk reaction) – there are ways to imbibe even military men with the idea that their governance doesn’t work for anyone, but obv not if it’s done in a confrontational manner.
It’s interesting that you say “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step” straight after you’ve gunned the article, which essentially carries the same sentiment.
Dear La Lucha Siempre,
I appreciate your clearly written synopsis of this article, which in a classroom discussion of how to effect change in an authoritarian state may actually make sense given the parameters of the discussion are maintained at some level of reality for the given country to be discussed.
However, there are too many weak points in the argument which relate more to the people, than to the regime.
Therefore, the author’s theoretical “what-if” scribbles on the chalkboard don’t add up to a correct answer to the problems in Burma.
You may be right that I have missed the point in this overly wordy 4-part presentation, but at the same time you may be missing the point of what I have written, by inaccurately assessing the long-term goals of the regime, and the regime’s deep pockets as regards military leaders at all levels who have been punching their career tickets carrying out orders to commit political oppression, ethnic persecution, and all manner of human-rights atrocities, all of which have kept them marching towards the pay-off of their turn at growing wealthy by extortion, confiscated lands, and forced labour.
The theory that the so-called government will somehow become weak around the elections is certainly a possibility, but not because of anyone “bending the rules”, it would have to be a full-scale national boycott, and without that, everything else theorized in the author’s painfully long, painfully verbose essay falls like dominoes.
The election in 1990 should tell the author what to to expect as a baseline for the post-election behaviour of the regime.
The SLORC regime made many mistakes which their SPDC successors “cleaned up” when they took over. And as we can see in their preemptive 2008 constitution and in their proactively tuned election laws, the SPDC does not intend to repeat those mistakes. (at least as long as the people show up in numbers to vote)
The ongoing business-as-usual persecution and military attacks against Burmese citizens behind the Bamboo Curtain should tell the author what the regime’s intent is as regards the future of Burma’s ethnic minority population.
If these innocent citizens are allowed to continue to suffer, nothing will have changed for the urban citizens either.(at least nothing they are going to like)
And, the treacherous manner in which the regime is stacking the elections deck in its favor should tell the author that the elections are the regime’s casino, and like all casinos, the games are designed for the house to win, and for the players to lose.
The promotion of the belief that the SPDC intends to allow subtle change to occur post-election looks to me like a coupon for free-play in the regime casino, and the author’s incoherantly verbose presentation is the equivalant of the casino tactic of having so many bells, flashing lights, and clinking coins as to hypnotize the players into believing this is their big chance to win.
In reality, all they need to do to win is to avoid losing, and to avoid losing, they must simply not play the regime game.
I don’t see this article as carrying the sentiment of being the first step forward towards freedom and democracy, I see it as two steps backward towards encouraging the citizens of Burma to trust the SPDC regime as they trusted the SLORC regime in 1990.
(Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me)
Small steps forward for a handful of regime pre-approved politicians who will be given the honor of becoming democratic window dressing for the regime is not going to change anything for “ALL” of the citizens of Burma, and therefore does not constitute forward progress.
It simply means a reversal of the old saying “a wolf in sheeps’ clothing”, wherein the non-regime parliament members will become “sheep in wolves’ clothing”.
Don’t underestimate the SPDC, Than Shwe is a marvel of dictatorial evolution, greed, ethnic revenge and persecution, who knows how, when, and where to apply torture and brutality. He has skillfully transformed passive Buddhist men into regime shock-troops, and stolen Burma’s natural resources to build-up and deploy one of the most vicious armies of oppression in modern history.
The only weakness of Than Shwe and his military will come on the day the people of Burma stand-up together and free themselves from the paralyzing miasma of regime induced fear.
Courage is the only spark which can light the torch of freedom, but that freedom will never be free.
Who knows the price of the revolution of the spirit which could convert military zombies back into human beings overnight?
It may cost the lives of hundreds, or thousands, or tens of thousands who will perish for simply standing-up to the truth of the tyranny which has impoverished their nation, tyranny which has devoured hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Burmese lives since the last elections in 1990 not in battle or protest, but in hate, violent persecution, rape, torture, mistreatment, medical neglect, and forced malnourishment.
It is unrealistic to think the carnivorous SPDC and Burma army beasts can now be negotiated with to become herbivores.
The slow way to freedom in Burma, means no way to freedom in Burma.
Garrett, I admire your dedication, and your border camp/IDP work is no doubt a valuable and generous commitment. My own experience in Burma is not in 5-star hotels, and I have never thought of my commitment to political reform and freedom in Burma as a “Burma buzz,” as you say. It’s not all so black-and-white, after all.
You and I are both aware of the schism in outside perceptions. It seems to me a sad and useless (but perhaps inevitable) disagreement between
border/refugee aid staff (“feet on the ground” types, as you say) and “slow change” advocacy groups.
Because of the nature of my work, however, I know a lot of community organizers, educators, social welfare start-ups, and “feet on the ground” people in Burma, each of whom have amazing stories. (I am well aware of the atrocities committed by the Burmese army toward the ethnic groups and countless citizens, but now I am talking about the majority of Burma’s people living “normal” lives of everyday difficulties). Many of these stories tell of
regime repression and their inability to help their own people. But many of the people I know are creating incredible civil society initiatives and working within the small spaces of autonomy (albeit under tight surveillance and vulnerable status). If I choose to support these actors, will you condemn me for supporting the status quo or perhaps be willing to concede that some of these people are working toward a larger good within immense constraints? Not working for the system but working within in.
Now, if you want to rule out the possibility of grassroots organizations making substantial contributions to a political dialogue in the country, fine. But if so, what’s the best alternative to your rejection of “the slow way to freedom”?
It seems to me an unfortunate, polarized debate between those working inside for change and those working to aid refugees on the border. I think we all want the same end result. But it is sad to hear the same demands by groups promoting unconditional freedom now unmet for decades. We need change now. I agree. So far that hasn’t come by playing the same game. We need an innovative and appropriate response to the regime’s intractability. At least Elliott is considering the ongoing situation and proposing new means for action.
What do you suggest, Garrett?
Hunter wrote: “My own experience in Burma is not in 5-star hotels, and I have never thought of my commitment to political reform and freedom in Burma as a “Burma buzz,” as you say.”
Dear Hunter,
You have just pushed one of my red buttons which pops up and flashes when someone evades the truth, or tries to use something I wrote out of context.
The “Burma Buzz” comment I made came at the end of a discussion of all of the truths about Burma which tourists will never learn from the urban citizens they will come in contact with during their travels in the tourist authorized areas.
It makes me wonder why you did not simply agree that those topics will not be brought up, or disagree and tell me that during your travels in urban Burma the people you have met with have freely volunteered and acknowledged the sort of information regarding the persecution of the ethnic minorities I discussed prior to writing that: “they want your money, not to kill your “Burma buzz”.
Prior to responding to your comments, I clicked on your name which is linked to your blog page.
I always like to read what other people do in SE Asia, so I read some of your posts.
One post in particular, “Pawn Shop Hotel, or How I Neatly Avoided Working in a Burmese Kitchen” was quite amusing and I enjoyed reading it.
However, considering your comment you made above: “My own experience in Burma is not in 5-star hotels”, I was surprised that in your blog you wrote:
” Wow, was Traders nice! The 5-star hotel lounge reminded me instantly of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam’s Park Hyatt Hotel, or any other major hotel in a developing Southeast Asian city. You are immediately removed from the ordinary grind of city life.”
I am sure you didn’t actually hang out in the lounge at Traders, or at any of the other expensive hotels in SE Asia you described.
You probably just had to pass through those lounges on your way to the elevators or the men’s room.
Don’t worry, I’m not going to tag you as a poster child for freespending NGO types who go to cities like Rangoon for “research” and then blow enough money on airfare, taxis, hotels, nice restaurants, and living the high life to support a rural clinic for a year, possibly saving hundreds of lives.
I’m sure you just mis-calculated how much money to bring with you on that trip, or that there were some extra charges you were unaware of.
Now, as for your civil society initiatives, if I read you correctly those initiatives are geared towards the issues of “the majority of Burma’s people living “normal” lives of everyday difficulties”.
This, in my opinion, is a major contributing factor to the ongoing persecution of the Burmese ethnic minority citizens whose issues are not even part of the agenda of the urban groups who are concerned strictly with their own welfare.
Indeed, the “spaces” you and the author describe are simply a part of the regime’s divide and conquer strategy, and the results will always be the same, the urban citizens will throw the ethnic minorities under the bus in order to make progress on their own issues.
But surprise, surprise!
They never make any progress, the carrot always dangles just out of reach, and the regime steamrollers over them on its own agenda which never waivers.
There many different types of civil society groups, some work in healthcare, others in education, and others work to dig wells, provide shelter materials, and build water supplies.
Do I condemn you for supporting who you choose to support?
No, not at all.
It’s your money and time and you can spend it any way you see fit which is acceptable to those who support you.
I guess my point is that NGO’s come and go, and political civil society organizations change from the UCTLF to the FLTCU to drop off the regime radar, and the song remains the same.
Then the next NGO or academic comes along and thinks he has found the rosetta stone of Burmese politics, and the political civil society groups smile and rub their hands together, and the regime smiles and rubs its hands together, and the poor people stay poor, and the persecuted people stay persecuted.
About all I can suggest is to study Prime Minister elect Aung San Suu Kyi, who was educated in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics and has a unique historical perspective as the daughter of Bogyoke Aung San.
Her beliefs as a leader are based on Buddhist concepts, as well as her education, her family background, and her understandings of international politics, AND ABOVE ALL, HER LOVE AND RESPECT FOR ALL BURMESE PEOPLE.
Daw Suu’s preferred method to attain freedom and democracy for ALL citizens of Burma was based on opening a dialogue between representatives of all ethnicities and political organizations, together with the SPDC regime to work out a peaceful roadmap towards true democracy and freedom for ALL Burmese citizens.
If the regime proved to be uncooperative, she was prepared to call for large scale nonviolent protests based on the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, who was a friend of her parents.
Was it the easy way?
No probably not, but pursuing an agenda which does not lead to breaking the impasse of SPDC tyranny accomplishes nothing positive, and hundreds of thousands who are out of sight, and out of mind will continue to die each year.
Was it the way which would result in the fewest casualties?
Hard to say, up to the soldiers’ threshold for following orders to slaughter nonviolent protestors in the streets.
Would it work?
Again, it is hard to say and based on the amount of training and discipline received by the people in the concepts of satyagraha.
The questions to ask are:
How much killing of urban nonviolent protestors can the soldiers withstand?
(NOT the ethnic minority citizens they have been trained to kill, but the urban citizenry, which is made up of THEIR families.)
What would Burma army soldiers in remote areas be thinking when they hear the news that thousands have been killed AGAIN by regime forces in and around Rangoon or Mandalay for the fifth straight day, the tenth straight day, for a month straight?
Would it even last that long, or cost that many lives before the soldiers would break ranks?
(The people will never know until they try, again and again.)
How much killing of nonviolent protestors can the United Nations withstand, before even China and Russia will be forced to act on behalf of the clear mandate of the Burmese people asking for protection under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Sorry mate, while I do appreciate your work on behalf of the favored urban people of Burma, what they and the rural persecuted need is not the slow boat to China they have been riding on for decades, they need Shock and Awe.
IT IS the only way to break the SPDC.
IT IS the only way towards the revolution of the spirit which will turn the Burma army zombies back into human beings.
And IT IS the only option the people have at hand to gain freedom and democracy for ALL Burmese citizens.
Other than the SPDC, no one wants to see any protestors shot or beaten in the streets, but at some point the scale has to be balanced against the hundreds of thousands who will die yearly because no actions were taken to protect them.
Otherwise, at some point the guns will be turned towards the cities.
The persecution, extortion, forced labour and forced relocation will be expanded to ever-increasing numbers of the urban population in order to feed the ever-increasing greed of the pack of wolves known as the SPDC/Burma army.
The regime is ten steps ahead of any political civil society groups, and if those groups are following crumbs of opportunity, you can bet the farm that those crumbs are leading into a regime snare.