Burmese Language
Progress is stifled by a stale debate
The issue of sanctions, mercifully marginalised in Burma political discourse by the lead up to and aftermath of November 2010 elections, is back again. In the past months, the popular press, think tanks, advocacy groups, and Burma watcher list-servs have dusted off the instruments and begun to play the same old tune, ostensibly debating the political efficacy of maintaining political and economic sanctions on Burma’s de facto ruling regime.
I say ‘ostensibly debating’ not to advance a conspiracy-theory that there’s something insidious going on here. But rather to highlight how predictable, how tired, how stale the debate is; like watching a re-run on television, subconsciously we already know how it’s going to end. And as such, it’s hard to call the current discourse a debate. That doesn’t mean that the stubborn persistence of talk about sanctions isn’t meaningful, however; rather, that this repetition without difference signifies an inability to think a different form of politics in Burma. That the recurrence of this discourse – and particularly that it’s coming mostly from groups who are located outside of Burma itself – point to the fact that Burma’s oppositional politics are formed, channelled, and even captured by actors who are peripheral to the place where politics really happens.
The irony, given all the acrimony, is how marginal sanctions are – at least on a material level. They only slightly affect the junta, given that the generals’ transactions with China, India, and ASEAN countries keep them vastly wealthy. Further, sanctions likely affect Burma’s poor only slightly as well – ultimately, the junta’s mismanagement of the economy and its destruction of human capital are vastly more relevant than the potential impact of Western companies. By the same token, revoking sanctions would also have minor material effects: foreign direct investment is not the missing variable through which the junta can be developed around. Moreover, economic analysis suggests that the effects of a potential rapid liberalisation of the economy without concomitant political changes could lead to mixed outcomes: short-term positive-sum gains would help the most vulnerable, particularly in the capital-starved agricultural sector. And yet, this immediate low-hanging fruit might give way to an even more brutal capitalist-authoritarianism, as rents captured from these increasing economic transactions may buttress the state’s ability to rationalise its extraction apparatus, allowing it to expropriate even more surplus from peasants. In other words, liberalisation will not help if most of the benefit goes to the state (and as inflation caused by a growing economy claws back at any residual gains not stolen).
These facts are not necessarily lost on most partisans, on either side. What is relevant, despite these limited material effects, are the significant symbolic political meanings supposedly contained in sanctions. Maintaining them is meant to give the regime a black-eye and to demonstrate solidarity with the opposition, empowering them to fight on while simultaneously providing a tool for reform; revoking them is meant to impel further progressive changes, coaxing a besieged regime out of its paranoiac shell.
But while these functional, path-dependent arguments often make for sound performative debate, I fear that they have the supplemental effect of overstating the importance of the symbolic meaning of sanctions – especially given the significant political and economic changes that have occurred as the regime withstood the assault of sanctions. As such, the sanctions debate has slid from a mere means (a tool to a larger end), to almost approaching that end in itself: the symbol has become larger than life, inflated by news articles, congressional hearings, and position papers. And in that process, sanctions has moved into the role of the central political question, becoming a platform for debates mostly between external audiences.
The unfortunate aspect of this is when countries and outside actors unilaterally thrust the sanctions issue again to the forefront, they effectively silence the voice of political actors in the country.
Lost in the tumult is an incredibly incisive political-economic analysis from the key opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), that highlights many of the ways sanctions are irrelevant; what is striking is how fundamentally reactive their document is, how the NLD seems compelled to respond to “the sanctions question” raised from the outside. Indeed, the document opens by mentioning the rise in calls to end sanctions, and closes by taking the audacious tack of distancing the party from sanctions entirely (“Sanctions are the result of decisions made by the countries concerned, not the outcome of demands by political parties, organizations or individuals in Burma.”).
Whether the NLD’s historical relationship with sanctions has always been so hands off is debatable. But if that’s the new narrative they want to construct, I’m not going to link to evidence suggesting otherwise. Their current distancing from sanctions signifies both the double-edged sword of relying on the “international community”, and also the hope that the opposition is finally escaping its political dependency on that fictive community. Sanctions, like the international community, are no magic bullet. They are a tool like any other, one that the NLD seems finally willing to wield strategically: by distancing itself from the policy itself, the NLD is free to use sanctions as a bargaining chip with the regime, or repudiate them entirely as a strategy for beginning to do politics inside the country again. The opposition needs to own the process; only the opposition can re-invest sanctions with a political meaning that has largely been drained from them over the years.
Otherwise, whatever political content sanctions could hold for those internal actors is pre-empted. For instance, one of the clearly new things inserted into the debate has been that stalwart supporters of sanctions are now willing to revisit them. Indeed, the United States and Germany have intimated recently that they may want to end sanctions; but their respective unilateral reviews – without seeming to allow the internal opposition to drive the process – seems like a cynical and self-interested attempt to reinstate strategic interests in a region increasingly dominated by China (betraying perhaps a cynical and self-interested motivation to maintain sanctions for so long: sanctions served the symbolic goal of looking good on human rights in a strategically meaningless country; now that China needs to be contained, human rights become expendable). The opposition groups could be free to reject a leadership role – but at least it should be offered.
Ah, but who is ‘the opposition’ anyway? Perhaps the desired change in US and German policy suggests that the role the NLD played for so long is no longer desirable. Beneath the tired sanctions debate external actors are negotiating and fighting over how to shape the opposition itself. This form of external meddling is so natural that we don’t even notice it.
Thus I conclude with this tentative suggestion: maybe we should forget sanctions altogether. Not necessarily revoke them – leave them as they are (the bad cop to the opposition’s good), but make a move at a right-angle to the current debate by insisting that the very talking about them gets in the way of the real politics. This is not to turn our backs on Burma, to leave them to the whims of an abusive regime; emphatically not. It is rather to think of new ways of doing that politics: thinking through what strategies, technologies, apparatuses, will facilitate the re-entrance of the average Burmese person into politics. Mining the politics of the everyday is a clear point of re-entry for oppositional groups in Burma; crafting non-adversarial political narratives surrounding what democracy means after the 2010 elections (what does it mean to be an active citizen, an engaged member of the polity?) may give currently acquiescent civil society new ways of engaging local people, thus re-orienting current political relationships. Only by doing this will things like sanctions (and international criminal courts, and human rights law, and ‘naming and shaming’) regain their potency, and we can actually have a real debate again.
Elliott Prasse-Freeman is currently an MPA-ID student at the Harvard Kennedy School, and is leading a number of research projects through the university’s Human Rights and Social Movements Program. He spent five years working in international development for various agencies—from the UN to international NGOs—where he directed projects in Burma, India, Thailand, and other countries in Southeast Asia.
Tags: burma, myanmar, national league for democracy, sanctions
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The basic truth is that without sanctions, there would be at least some economic growth, that the regime would be less paranoid, that the top guys would be more business-oriented, that a bigger middle class would develop and that within 5-10 years there could be a successful Egypt or Indonesia style uprising. If you want to know what will happen after 50 years of sanctions (in 2030) – just look at Cuba – Castro’s still in charge and handing over to his brother.
FIGHTING PEACOCK NLD? NO MAN, it belongs to student of 1988 uprising. peacock is symbol of burmese monarchy. so wot der fook r u doing with monarchy symbol? get lost!
This article suggests a way to part with the crrent stale debates about the sanctions, and to start a new course of ideas and actions to bring about a change in Burma. I would like to quote an extract:
“Thus I conclude with this tentative suggestion: maybe we should forget sanctions altogether. Not necessarily revoke them – leave them as they are (the bad cop to the opposition’s good), but make a move at a right-angle to the current debate by insisting that the very talking about them gets in the way of the real politics. This is not to turn our backs on Burma, to leave them to the whims of an abusive regime; emphatically not. It is rather to think of new ways of doing that politics: thinking through what strategies, technologies, apparatuses, will facilitate the re-entrance of the average Burmese person into politics.”
I am tired of seeing (I do not read them now) endlessly repeated circular arguments.
So I for one particularly would like to thank Mr. Elliott Prasse-Freeman for his excellent analytical report. Thank you.
People in Burma, the political groups don’t get to speak freely about things and the people concerned and who are maybe from Burma have greater access to what’s happening in the world and to act without fear. Same thing happens in Zimbabwe, many are outside the country and there are growing numbers of displaced people expected as environmental pressures combine with scarce resources to put a bind on the situation.. Not only Burma. To say Burma and not Myanmar is political. No my thoughts are of a new way of casting the problems of the world against the need to raise the ships of all nations, economically if possible but certainly with an eye to keeping the planet alive with all people gaining a place in that endeavor. Sanctions are being used in nations around the world with little effect and they allow abuses to continue because wealth from resource extraction flows to the abusive government by contract and those monies are used for war against the people of the nation and to keep them down. That and the companies doing business in countries with sanctions applied often pay very low which also lessens the people’s ability to engage in things like politics.. Timing is essential and what’s happening in the world at large is an essential element to the discussion at hand.. I pay attention to Burma and what is happening in the world and I make comment and stuff but not with bad intent. I am attempting to better my own country, the US and to find a way to trigger connections between keeping the planet alive and the need for better governance. I’m taking risks but the types of fights are those that can have good outcomes and new ways of conducting business with the world at large.. Human rights and those of a living place called Earth that needs systems intact and all people engaged. Timing is essential to change and this is not a time that will be repeated.
Elliot Prasse-Freeman makes some very good points, but he needs to pick a side and then commit himself, instead of faulting others outside of Burma for doing the same things he does. Although Elliot has become much more realistic since his pre-sham election “Retaking Power In Burma” article, he shows tremendous prowess when it comes to sweeping the multitude of regime human rights offenses into a pile under the ‘naming and shaming’ rug.
With such skillful use of $5 words and his ability to adeptly omit important human rights issues, I get the feeling Elliott is being groomed to become a future Secretary General of the United Nations.
Like so many others who discuss Burma’s political and economic issues, including most Burmans, Elliott fails to make any mention of the persecution of Burmese ethnic minority citizens, and the exploitation of their land and resources.
This apathy towards keeping human rights at the top of the discussion list allows the regime to do whatever it wishes, to kill, rape, torture, and enslave whomever they want, to displace tens of thousands of citizens and deny them their crops, and to burn their homes, schools, clinics, and churches. How can the regime’s ongoing programs of forced starvation, forced relocation, and forced labour which affect such a substantial segment of the Burmese population remain off-limits for discussion?
For all intents and purposes, it appears that what happens behind the Bamboo Curtain, stays behind the Bamboo Curtain. Are these millions of Burmese citizens being written off as the cost of doing business?
Soe Thane wrote:
“The basic truth is that without sanctions, there would be at least some economic growth, that the regime would be less paranoid, that the top guys would be more business-oriented, that a bigger middle class would develop and that within 5-10 years there could be a successful Egypt or Indonesia style uprising.”
I can’t imagine what Soe Thane’s prognostications of post-sanctions Burma are based on, a crystal ball? An opium pipe? Tarot cards? Reading tea leaves?
It is much more likely that with “some economic growth” the regime will be just as paranoid, only they will have more discretionary funds to spend on security forces to protect their new found wealth, the top guys will be business-oriented in the business of extorting anyone who has joined the bigger middle class, which will mean the poor people below them will not have to worry about becoming overweight, and in 5-10 years another 500,000-1,000,000 or more ethnic minority men, women, and children will needlessly die in the name of “some economic growth”.
It is asinine to continue to deal with Than Shwe and his military regime as though they are simply teenaged bullies who are going through a phase which they will outgrow. Look at the news since the sham elections, the regime is gorging itself on apathy, both foreign and domestic, and it is growing stronger and more virulent every day. And, with the tacit approval of everyone who conveniently prefers not to bring it up, the regime is deploying the Burma army in-force to the ethnic homelands to do what they have been trained to do.
However, I am glad to see Elliott calling for less focus on fruitless debates over the current sanctions. These sanctions are simply locks which keep honest people honest.
If Elliott Prasse-Freeman or anyone else wanted to help the Burmese people, they would be advocating even stronger sanctions which will make it more difficult to do business with the brutal and greedy regime. Remember, the idea is to usher the regime out of power as soon as possible, NOT to extend its shelf-life.
But just like the international corporate partners of dictatorships around the world, the Burmese regime’s partners are above the law, and since they contribute to the right election campaigns and control the media, they don’t worry about sanctions anyways, they only worry about cheap stolen natural resources, cheap labour, high profits which grease the skids of commerce, and looking the other way while the regime makes it all possible by applying Burma army boots to Burmese civilian throats.
This is why approaching Than Shwe, the SPDC, and now the faux-democratic puppet government as though they are reasonable people who can be reasoned with and shown a better way, is very good for the regime and its partners, and very bad for the citizens of Burma.
As Elliott aptly puts it:
“Moreover, economic analysis suggests that the effects of a potential rapid liberalisation of the economy without concomitant political changes could lead to mixed outcomes: short-term positive-sum gains would help the most vulnerable, particularly in the capital-starved agricultural sector. And yet, this immediate low-hanging fruit might give way to an even more brutal capitalist-authoritarianism, as rents captured from these increasing economic transactions may buttress the state’s ability to rationalise its extraction apparatus, allowing it to expropriate even more surplus from peasants. In other words, liberalisation will not help if most of the benefit goes to the state (and as inflation caused by a growing economy claws back at any residual gains not stolen).”
It is a terrible mistake to remain obsessed with the economy while avoiding constant scrutiny and discussion of the regime’s human rights offenses committed against Burmese ethnic minority citizens which represent a greed for human suffering and exploitation which is every bit as important to the regime as their greed for wealth and power. There are no political nor economic solutions for the predominantly Burman SPDC regime’s domination, persecution, and exploitation of Burmese ethnic minority citizens, and if they are allowed to abuse one-third of the population, what will stop them from eventually abusing the other two-thirds in the same manner?
ANSWER: If the regime were to proclaim ethnic equality tommorrow, the other two-thirds will become fair-game for the same inhumane treatment, the same extortion, the same forced labour and forced relocation, and if they have any problems following orders they will share the same forced starvation. They will see their ricefields converted to rubber, palm oil, and castor oil plantations, they will see their men taken from the cities and put to work where they can be more productive and profitable to the regime.
The Burma army has been well-trained to carry out these types of domestic programs, and they have had a lot of on the job training with real people.
The Burmese military regime represents a classic “Pyramid Scheme” style organization with Than Shwe and the SPDC generals at the top, followed by their business cronies, the commanders of the armed forces, the rank and file soldiers of the armed forces, the government workers, and finally, at the bottom of the pyramid are those Burmese citizens who may (or may not) someday be able to gleen crumbs of an increased economy which may (or may not) have sifted down to them if they go along with the anti-sanctions program, play the regime’s games, and trust everyone above them to be generous.
But we are not talking about a corporate structure where people have salaries, and budgets to pay those below them. We are talking about minimum wages, and each participant’s opportunity to succeed within this system comes from his skill in extracting what he can from those below him on the pyramid, a dog eat dog society.
What they will end up with is the same as what they have now,…greed and corruption at every level of the government and armed forces, and a citizenry which must remain apathetic to regime wrongdoings or suffer even worse consequences than merely living in poverty. This apathy is so ingrained into Burmese society, that they ALMOST NEVER mention the suffering of those Burmese citizens who suffer from beneath the pyramid.
I am all too aware of the “if I don’t work today – I don’t eat today” world which too many urban Burmese citizens face. I wonder how they will possibly cope when they join those whose world goes more along the lines of: “I worked today so I could eat today – but Burma army soldiers came and demanded rice and then took my pigs and chickens and laughed as they shot my pregnant goat. Then, before they left, they gang-raped my daughter, beat my son unconscious, and burned down my home”.
Appeasement of, and engagement with Than Shwe, the SPDC regime, and the faux-democratic government of Burma will only be the catalyst for more and more negative changes such as those we are seeing in the news EVERY DAY since the sham elections.
The generals are laughing, with so many wishy-washy liberal “Burma experts” and corporate lobbyists working on their behalf, it has never been so easy for them to do WHATEVER THEY WANT.
Like taking candy from a baby.
(or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say, like taking rice from a starving baby)
Wow. Garrett’s comments are longer than the original article. Well done.
Soe Thane says:
“Wow. Garrett’s comments are longer than the original article. Well done.”
Putting your sarcasm aside, I was glad to help Elliott out by filling-in all of the blanks he left empty.
Hopefully before he posts another article, Elliott will get the hint and not leave out so many important issues which are all part of the problems faced by the Burmese people whether popularly mentioned in discussion or not.
As Aung San Suu Kyi said in her message smuggled out of Burma by UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari in November 2007 following the ill-fated “Saffron Revolution”:
“in this time of vital need for democratic solidarity and national unity, it is my duty to give constant and serious considerations to the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations and forces as possible, in particular those of our ethnic nationality races.”
I realize that for those who are agenda-driven it would represent a major sacrifice of the extra time it takes to deal with issues which are less likely to turn a profit, but I think that the concepts found in Daw Suu’s statement should be the guidelines for any discussions having to do with Burma, by Burmese citizens and foreigners alike.
Soe Thane, lets look at Cuba, they have a more healthier population than the antagonists America, maybe sanctions are good for the population??!
Dear Shwe Moe,
What is your fixation on diverting the conversation away from Burma?
Shouldn’t you be comparing Cuba’s health system with Burma’s health system?
Or does your fight or flight reflex again lead you away from facing Burmese issues?
No worries, I don’t expect you to actually answer these questions, you’ll just sit back like a Jack-in-the-box until somebody else winds you up again.
I suppose I could build a persona with a fake Burmese name too, like so many seem to be doing, but what someone’s nationality is, their color, their ethnicity or race, and/or the ancient history of the country they came from/live in is irrelevant to discussion of these topics which are dealing with the HERE and NOW of BURMA, and the welfare of Burmese citizens.
And when I say “citizens”, I refer to ALL Burmese citizens, not just a handful of the Burman majority citizens who might benefit from the lifting of sanctions.
Of course, if you are in favor of writing-off Burma’s ethnic minorities in order to find out whether lifting sanctions will actually help any more than a small fraction of Burma’s citizens in any significant way, you can go ahead and say so… right here, and right now.
Sanctions never works. Burmese military officials and their friends are richer and richer everyday.
Sanction never target people from the top as they claim to be. Sanctions always target general population and when majority of the people have economic hardship, there will be upriaing.
Only then a ccountry like US will have a reason to come in and to invate and put their puppet government in place.
Always remember. Sanctions never target people on top as they claim to be. They only target general population to bring into economic hardship to create uprising.
This is what sanctions are all about.
In response to the anti-sanctions comments made by “DVB FAN”, a comment made by Khin Nyo in the “Rangoon Workers Stage Mass Strike” thread sums up the historical truth of the before and after effects of sanctions on urban Burmese citizens.
Khin Nyo wrote:
“I don’t know sanction is bad for people because before the sanction back in 80′s we did not have enough medicine in our hospital, no text books for the students in schools, no food in our kitchen and it was going on and until today. We treated the patients with what we got in hands, our kids learned with by heart memorizing notes, we ate whatever we had. We just need basic human rights, food, education and health. we don’t need tanks, guns and weapons.”
For millions of Burmese citizens the sanctions have no effect either way, because regardless of how rich the regime is, it will always continue to persecute, extort, and enslave Burma’s ethnic minorities, burn their homes, clinics, schools, and churches, and extract the natural resources of their homelands.
The regime and its cronies are richer and richer each day because they are adept at extracting wealth from Burma’s natural resources.
They are also good at profiting from building hydro-electric dams which also cause displacement, starvation, and suffering to the ethnic minority citizens whose villages and ricefields are in the inundation zones.
The regime also profits from forced labour, and the Burma army soldiers are good at extorting whatever they can from millions of ethnic minority citizens be it money, building materials, personal possessions, or livestock.
The more money the urban citizens are able to make, the more money the regime and its cronies will extort from them.
THIS is what the regime is all about.
The ridiculous idea that the U.S. might someday unilaterally invade Burma to install a “puppet government” is an absurd fantasy.
Besides, Burma already has a “puppet government” right now.
I think it would be more appropriate to worry more about China invading Burma.
china did not have to invade burma. england and america had given Burma to china as present.
Dear Fook-kaung, aka Myanmar Patriots, aka Myanmar Patriot4 UMPF, aka Burmese People, aka HRH Crown Prince Shwebomin, aka HM King Shwebomin II, aka the Mad Hatter of Leytonstone,
The situation for the people of Burma is bad enough without your dry British humour.
Now, don’t you have a cottilion or a fox hunt to attend to?
Pip-pip & Cheerio old chap
Garrett
I think much of the previous commentary misses one of the main aspects of Mr. Prasse-Freeman’s article; in that he immediately highlights what purpose previous debates regarding sanctions serve, which is that such stale debates steal political agency from opposition forces within Burma; and that only the opposition can take back agency from such hollow rhetoric. Or, in other words, Elliott appears to be calling for a different sort of dialogue that has thus far been side-skirted by commentators from outside Burma; and the politicization of sanctions for the benefit of Western leaders, etc.
Thus, I remain bemused by Mr. Garrett’s own ironical hypocrisy when he immediately faults Elliott for not choosing a side; yet such a demand clearly misses the tactic picking sides serves in such a debate, as illustrated by Elliott when he states in regards to USA and Germany rethinking their stalwart support of sanctions, that such a reconsideration, “seems like a cynical and self-interested attempt to reinstate strategic interests in a region increasingly dominated by China (betraying perhaps a cynical and self-interested motivation to maintain sanctions for so long: sanctions served the symbolic goal of looking good on human rights in a strategically meaningless country; now that China needs to be contained, human rights become expendable). Thus, if Elliott had “chosen a side” what purpose would that serve, isn’t that precisely what he is saying (especially as someone outside Burma opposition forces) that we need to avoid? Therefore, it would seem that Garrett’s demand serves nothing more than his own self-interest to appear more knowledgeable than everyone on anything related to Burma; as clearly illustrated by his peanut gallery attack on anyone who dares to leave a comment in this space; which is rather ironical because one would think such pointless insults (and for the most part) hypocritical and baseless commentary works to squash any sort of reinvigorated…
dialogue between people, which is exactly what Elliott’s article calls for; thus, it would seem that Mr. Garrett is more a fan of dominating speech rather than promoting its flow; which is also ironic because he faults users for creating fake-Burmese-sounding names but whoever gave him the authority to judge who/what is real and unreal; isn’t that precisely the type of politics Elliott argues against – which is also funny because Garrett prizes Elliott’s ability to sweep complex problems under the guise of $5 phrases such as naming and shaming, but such a tactic seems to be Garrett’s only device. If anything, the commentary section, here, proves the strength of this article’s argument, that the tireless debate about sanctions leads to hollow, meaningless rhetoric that becomes more about outsiders scoring political points than creating a real change. Really, I won’t be shocked when in about ten minutes from now Garrett finds some reason why I’m not worthy of my own opinion on this article. I’ll try not to endeavor Garrett’s game too much by resorting to personal insults over analysis.
On a final note, Garrett also claims that, “Elliott fails to make any mention of the persecution of Burmese ethnic minority citizens, and the exploitation of their land and resources.” Yet, I would hope that any astute reader would know that, that is precisely what this article does, as is clear for anyone who has taken a basic economics course, or let me provide this quote, “Moreover, economic analysis suggests that the effects of a potential rapid liberalisation of the economy without concomitant political changes could lead to mixed outcomes: short-term positive-sum gains would help the most vulnerable, particularly in the capital-starved agricultural sector. And yet, this immediate low-hanging fruit might give way to an even more brutal capitalist-authoritarianism, as rents captured from these increasing economic transactions may buttress the state’s ability to…
rationalise its extraction apparatus, allowing it to expropriate even more surplus from peasants.”
Now, ahead of any forthcoming peanut comments from Garrett, unfortunately I just wasted all my breath committing the same hypocritical error that Garrett made and which Elliott vehemently argues against: in that I have said absolutely NOTHING substantial or added to any sort of productive dialogue about Burma, the exploitation of the Burmese people, etc. and so on… instead, I’ve committed my time to making CIRCULAR points focused on attacking a solitary person, who serves as a perfect analogy for the squawking of Western political actors – in that nowhere here do I hear anything new, alternative, progress or of the voice of the Burmese people. And that, I believe, is Elliott’s primary point – and an excellent one at that, if I may say so.
Dear SCK,
It is clear that you have an agenda to attack me for criticising Elliott, & I am neither concerned, nor intimidated by your verbose diatribe, for it is a typical response whenever academic “Burma experts” like Elliott Prasse-Freeman receive criticism, & you neither need to understand the issues, nor care about the people being discussed in order to make your comments in support of (fill in the blank).
I get-it, & in-fact I am surprised that it took this long for the inevitable academic defense speech to come along.
Bravo! You were magnificent!
Tell me another story Mr.SCK, I like stories!
Fortunately, in spite of your mafia defense lawyer tactics of misquotes & comments out of context, everything I have written is there for everyone to read, & far from hoping anyone (including Elliot) trusts my comments, I hope they will simply use them as the basis for their own investigations.
I have lived & worked along the Thai/Burma border with Burmese ethnic minority refugees, taught English to Burmese orphans in my spare time, worked with & studied the reports gathered by NGO’s which make cross-border incursions to Eastern Burma in order to deliver medical aid & clothing to IDP’s in deep jungle hide-sites, & personally traveled into Eastern Burma with cease-fire groups & NGO’s in order to deliver food & medical supplies & to help set-up & fund clinics & schools for displaced refugees.
I am quite comfortable that I have a valid real-world opinion to draw upon to make my comments & my criticisms.
When I see the issues which are the crux of the problems faced by the Burmese people overlooked, omitted, & yes, swept under the “naming & shaming” rug out of convenience, it is my prerogative as a Democratic Voice of Burma reader to make sure those issues see the light of day.
I think Elliott is a big boy who can take the criticism, & if he truly cares about the future of the people of Burma as I do, he will learn from the real-life experiences of…